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Abstract 
 
This article traces the intellectual contributions of Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) 
intellectual and founder Hou Yuon, whose influence on party policy has been the subject 
of scholarly debate. Although proposals in his political writings were implemented in 
CPK liberated zones and, later, Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979), his outspoken 
nature led to his ejection from the CPK picture and from appraisals of Cambodian 
Communism. From his studies in France to his death in 1975, Hou Yuon’s importance as 
a Cambodian Marxist and Communist deserves our attention. Marxist theory provided 
him a critical interpretive paradigm and language with which to contextualize 
Cambodia’s stark rural-urban divide and larger issues of global capitalist exploitation in 
his writings, most notably in his 1955 doctoral dissertation. The goal of this article is to 
uncover the link between Hou Yuon’s application of Marxist theory to understand 
inequality and underdevelopment in his homeland and more broadly, to fill the gap 
between the Paris Group Cercle Marxiste and many of its members’ leap to “pure 
socialism” and “total equality” in founding Democratic Kampuchea. 
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Introduction 
 
Hou Yuon (1930–1975), a founding member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
(CPK), became a Communist during his studies in 1950s Paris, where he read and 
engaged with Marxist works to frame solutions to Cambodia’s underdevelopment. A 
onetime Parti Communiste Français (PCF) cell member and mentor to Cambodian 
students, Hou was a highly influential Marxist political analyst, leftist teacher, and 
politician who was instrumental in garnering support for the CPK and helped 
conceptualize some of its early policies (figure 1). An anonymous member of his Paris 
cohort stated in an interview that if Pol Pot had followed Hou Yuon instead of having 
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him killed, then “it would not have been like this…. Yuon allowed the use of money; he 
opposed the evacuation; and he only wanted to have exchange labor groups and not to 
have cooperatives in the countryside” (Chea 2000). But to date, scholars have largely 
dismissed Hou’s role in framing Democratic Kampuchea (DK, 1975–1979).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hou Yuon, Communist Party of Kampuchea Minister of the Interior in charge of 
urbanization and cooperative management, delivering a statement on the twenty-third 
anniversary of the fighting in Amlaing district, September 30, 1974. Source: Used by permission 
from the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCCAM). 
 
One position holds that Hou and other Paris-educated Cambodian intellectuals 
were “nonentities” until the late 1960s—“more Vietnamese than the Vietnamese when 
it came to Cambodia”—and that their popularity “was exploited by the Communists to 
give their movement a misleading public face” (Heder 2004, 2, 8). Future CPK Minister 
of Defense (1967–1975), DK Prime Minister (1976), and Chairman of the DK State 
Presidium (1976–1979) Khieu Samphan himself claimed that he and Hou Yuon were 
mere “figurehead[s]” (Khieu Samphan 2004, 67–68), whereas former CPK intellectual 
Suong Sikœun regards Hou Yuon as one of the CPK’s “principal leaders” alongside Pol 
Pot, Khieu Samphan, and future DK Minister of Information (1975–1977) Hu Nim, and 
the lone advocate for free-choice cooperatives. Suong does concede, however, that Hou 
was “never a member of the…ruling party” due to his murder in 1975 (Suong 2013, 39–
41). Vietnamese suspicions in the 1960s of high-ranking CPK figures that were “little-
known…and inevitably suspect because they were educated in France instead of in 
Hanoi”—a description that fits Hou and his Paris cohort—highlights the lack of 
consensus on Hou’s leadership role in the CPK (Mosyakov 2004, 49). As for Hou’s 
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writings, notably his 1955 economics dissertation “Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses 
projets de modernisation” (The Cambodian peasantry and its modernization projects), 
British journalist Philip Short contends that it “would be wrong [to see in it] a blueprint 
for the economic system that the Khmer Rouge introduced in Cambodia in 1975.” But 
he admits that “many of the key concepts of the Khmer Rouge experiment…can be 
traced back to the discussions that took place at that time” (Short 2004, 290). If we 
consider how influential Hou’s work was on his protégés, then is it a stretch to suggest, 
at the very least, that his work is part of this larger conversation on Cambodian society? 
Hou’s diagnoses of systemic problems in rural-urban and local-global relations, his 
career as a progressive politician, his influence on leading CPK figures, and his 
contributions to the CPK’s Marxist-Leninist orientation highlight how he ought to be part 
of the larger conversation on Cambodian Communism. A man who best understood the 
Marxism of his troupe, Hou sought to alter Cambodia’s course without the total erasure 
of the existing political system, feeling instead that “class conflict should be resolved by 
a method that will not damage the unity of the nation” (Um 2015, 88). He also 
recognized the “viability of an accommodationist stance and ideological alignment with 
Sihanouk’s ‘anti-imperialist’ platform” (Um 2015, 88). Hou was the unanimous choice to 
lead the Paris-based Association des Étudiants Khmers (AEK, Khmer Students 
Association) and its successor organization, the Union des Étudiants Khmers (UEK). His 
dissertation provides “perhaps the most detailed and penetrating analysis of the 
Kampuchean rural socio-economic structure available” (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 31; see 
also Sher 2001, 85; Becker 1998, 80) in describing an exploited peasantry—or prolétariat 
agricole (agricultural proletariat) as he terms it. It proposed, most famously, the 
establishment of “semi-social types of agricultural production cooperatives” tailored to 
ameliorate peasant living standards (Hou 1955, 81, 145). Pol Pot later espoused, rather 
enthusiastically, several of Hou’s proposals, implemented them in liberated zones after 
1973, and expanded them after 1975 (Pol Pot 1977, 63–67). Hou espoused existing 
ideas like a socioeconomic analysis of five rural classes, self-reliance, and 
antifeudalism—all of which were tied directly to Third Worldism and the nonaligned 
movement in which the CPK was an active participant. These ideas struck a chord with 
Pol Pot not because they were original or particularly innovative, but because Hou 
framed them in a way that was applicable and relatable to Cambodia’s then-current 
situation. It is therefore unsurprising that Hou’s failure to implement his ideas in actual 
practice led Pol Pot to apply his violent approach to agrarian collectivization, which 
arguably resulted from, and was a logical next step of, Hou’s ideas on the topic. 
After his studies, Hou translated his popularity and reverence into politics, which, 
alongside his writings, formed a nascent part of DK’s intellectual framing (Sher 2004, 
207). By the early 1960s he worked as a schoolteacher at Phnom Penh’s Lycée 
Kambuboth, which he developed into a “center of radicalism” as its director and “best-
known leader” (Chandler and Kiernan 1983, 175). He was simultaneously a leading 
figure in the pro-China Association d’Amitié Khméro-Chinoise (AAKC, Khmer-Chinese 
Friendship Association) before its closure by royal order in 1967 (Phouk 1977, 9). Hou’s 
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willingness to work with Cambodian head of state Norodom Sihanouk’s Sangkum Riyastr 
Niyum (Community of the common people) changed that year after the outbreak of the 
Samlaut Rebellion, as he joined the maquis (Cambodian Communist guerrillas). 
Thereafter, he became Minister of the Interior, Cooperatives, and Communal Reforms 
of the Gouvernement Royal d’Union Nationale du Kampuchéa (GRUNK, Royal 
Government of the National Union of Kampuchea; Khmer: Reachorodthaphibeal 
Ruobruom Cheat Kampuchea), an important, yet somewhat ceremonial, role. He served 
through the 1975 takeover until his mysterious death in 1975 or 1976, though CPK 
Central Committee members posthumously exonerated him as “rehabilitated” by 
September 1978 (Sher 2004, 290). 
Although the CPK pursued policies of Third Worldism, abolishing currency, and 
import-substitution (exporting rice to China to accumulate surplus capital to modernize 
industry), Hou Yuon’s analysis of Cambodian peasant issues helped guide some of DK’s 
most notorious leaders and architects on their path toward implementing the country’s 
radical social transformation and genocide between 1975 and 1979. Hou’s analysis—and 
distorted view of some of Cambodia’s socioeconomic realities—was at the root of 
Cambodia’s Communist regime, as Pol Pot interpreted, reinterpreted, and (mis)used 
Hou’s proposals (either directly or as reiterated by Hou’s protégés Khieu Samphan and 
Hu Nim). For Hou, Marxism provided a critical interpretive paradigm for developing 
concrete solutions, but, importantly, his engagement with Marxism was through a 
practical lens, recognizing that Cambodia had served as merely another cog in the 
moving wheel of an already prosperous imperial nation’s wealth machine. Hou’s 
approach, encapsulated in his dissertation, was also informed by economists (Paul 
Bernard, Adhémard Leclère, and René Morizon), agronomists (Yves Henry and René 
Dumont), and dependency (core-periphery) theories of the 1950s. By the early 1960s, 
he was an influential figure in progressive intellectual circles in Cambodia and later 
organized a pro-Cultural Revolution wing within the CPK (with Hu Nim and Pol Pot’s 
personal secretary Phouk Chhay). Hou’s disciple Khieu Samphan became one of Pol Pot’s 
chief lieutenants (Phouk 1977, 9–10). In analyzing Hou’s path to becoming a Communist 
and his lasting influence on so many of his CPK peers, we seek to uncover a better 
understanding of the larger intellectual thrust behind DK.  
This article applies the genealogical method to situate Hou Yuon within the larger 
Cambodian Communist sounding board (Hinton 2005, 142). The aim is to understand 
more fully his lasting imprint on DK’s architects through his writings and career, as well 
as to trace his passages through spaces intellectual and geographic, transforming and 
transformed. Though select excerpts of his dissertation are examined elsewhere 
(Kiernan and Boua 1982, 34–68), this article explores the work in its entirety, situating it 
in the life trajectory of its author. Accordingly, the article takes the form of a 
biographical triptych covering: (1) Hou’s early adult years and becoming a Communist in 
the student-activist milieu of the French metropole; (2) an analysis of his doctoral text 
and subsequent book Banha sahakor (The cooperative question); and (3) his limited 
ability to bridge ideological thought and political practice while serving in a series of 
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high-level ministerial posts and intellectual associations under Sihanouk’s regime. The 
article tracks Marxism’s rise as a major influence on Hou and his intellectual 
engagement with its concepts (the agrarian question, the question of cooperatives, and 
theory of productive forces, among others). The article then explores how he applied in 
his political career (his initial failed implementation of Marxist concepts to Cambodia) 
what he had written about in his dissertation, which was highly influential on his 
onetime protégés and CPK comrades Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim. As revealed in his 
activist career trajectory, there was some continuity between Hou’s proposals and CPK 
programs (Etcheson 1984, 51). His lived biography therefore betrays the life of a civil 
bureaucrat whose professional life was complicit in a regime that oppressed peasants 
and was at complete odds with the praxis and revolutionary aspects that formed the 
nexus of the radical thought and political action that he held aloft. In the end, Hou was 
unable to put the theory of his student life into public practice. But although he fell 
victim to shifting geopolitical and domestic tides and, ultimately, failed to exert enough 
influence in his limited positionality to influence political outcomes and to save himself, 
his contributions to CPK thought and practice must not be understated. 
 
Early Years and Conversion to Communism, 1930–1953 
 
Hou Yuon was born in 1930 to mixed Sino-Khmer lineage. His father, Hou Him, grew rice 
and tobacco on the Mekong River in Angkor Ban (Kompong Cham) not far from Hou’s 
future CPK colleague Hu Nim, who was born in Korkor (Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer 
1952b, 3; Hu Nim 1977, 1). Until the 1930s, few Khmers had access to French education 
at any level in the protectorate, as the colonial administration favored Chinese and 
Vietnamese students for civil service education (Chandler and Kiernan 1983, 14). Under 
the puppet king Sisowath Monivong (1875–1941) and the region’s true authority, the 
Résident Supérieur du Cambodge, the protectorate was a colonial police state; thus the 
Khmer majority was largely disconnected from ideas of European democracy, socialism, 
and the nation-state (Tully 1996, vii, xii). After decades of the French favoring 
Vietnamese for colonial administrative positions, however, a new generation of Khmer 
elites benefitted from a new French policy of cultural coexistence in the 1930s. Now, the 
protectorate’s best and brightest Khmer students, often from the wealthiest families, 
had access to French classics (Tully 1996, 309). 
Despite his rural upbringing, Hou received a French-language education, an 
important factor in the “semiotics of status” in French Cambodge, because anything 
French that could be consumed—language, culture, products—represented an elevated 
standing (Edwards 2007, 62). Cambodian students spoke French in French schools, and 
French colonial rule was what they knew. French was therefore the “prism through 
which they viewed the outside world” (Short 2004, 47). Hou’s worldview was certainly 
evidence of this fact. He gained admission to the prestigious Collège Norodom Sihanouk, 
a junior high school in Kompong Cham, where in 1942 its first class comprised a mere 
twenty students (Tyner 2008, 35). At the Collège, a French education entailed 
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immersion in French literature, which by dint of its emphasis on thought and 
achievement in the French Revolution and the pillars of French nationhood—liberté, 
égalité, fraternité—influenced his perception of the Cambodge protectorate as a nation 
(Cambodia). His teachers’ aim, however, was to “create elites, assistants…with a view to 
a useful collaboration, to help in the moral and intellectual uplifting of the race, to 
augment its dignity and well-being, and to enrich their country by intelligent and 
sustained labor” (Tully 1996, 220). But despite their efforts, Hou and his cohort 
developed strong nationalist sentiments through shared experiences as students 
reading French classics about revolution, romance, and emancipation. As his classmate, 
future understudy, and CPK comrade Khieu Samphan recalled, they were “profoundly 
influenced by the spirit of French thought—by the Age of Enlightenment, of Rousseau 
and Montesquieu” (Harris 2013, 182n7). The “comradeship of the classroom,” as it turns 
out, served Khmer students “as a microcosm of the emergent nation” rather than as a 
bastion of an ancien régime (Henley 1995, 293). 
The centralized French educational system had the entire student body master the 
same curriculum. “History was taught with no adaptation to local conditions, so that 
future citizens and colonial subjects alike would identify with French history and with 
French political values,” French sociologist Serge Thion notes (Chandler and Kiernan 
1983, 14). This lasting legacy of the French remained long after independence, as a 
generation of French-educated students became Francophone and Francophile. 
Importantly, we see a prime example of the irony of the French mission civilisatrice 
(civilizing mission): French educators wanted to train Khmers to become proper civil 
servants of a French domain, yet through immersion in all things French, young Khmers 
learned about the greatness of liberty, equality, and fraternity, which inspired 
nationalist imaginings (Tyner 2008, 35). In fact, Lycée Sisowath was established in 1935 
by the author of “How to Be a Khmer Civil Servant,” Résident Supérieur du Cambodge  
Achille Louis Auguste Sylvestre, and its students were the first to develop nationalist 
ideas, with the first anticolonial demonstrations occurring in 1936 and Buddhist 
demonstrations in the 1940s (later forming the Krom Brachathibtey, Democrat Party) 
(Edwards 2007, 224). Hou and other future CPK heads attended secondary school at 
Lycée Sisowath. Future CPK Minister of Foreign Affairs Ieng Sary studied there, where he 
spearheaded the “Liberation of Cambodia from French Colonialism” group (Becker 1998, 
69). The significance of Lycée Sisowath was that it brought together young minds—Hou 
included—giving them the rare freedom to associate and discuss relevant topics, which 
ultimately helped develop strong bonds of connection and commitment to a common 
goal (Edwards 2007, 224). As an anonymous member of Hou’s Paris cohort recalled: 
 
We read books and newspapers, and we had a lot of freedom of 
thought and knowledge…. They [the French] did not let us know about 
Communism…at Sisowath [High School]. They just told us that there was 
Marxist philosophy. But they never let us know what Marxism was. Nor 
were there books to read. But when we went there [France], we had 
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newspapers. The French Communist Party published newspapers and 
we read them. And the French Communists helped French colonial 
countries to be freed from the yoke of the colonial rule. They helped us 
a lot such as with ideas. As we wanted independence for the country, 
and when we saw them helping us, we joined with their ideas. We loved, 
we liked, and learned [Communism]. And when we learned, we saw that 
this ideology was good and just. The Communist ideology had justice: it 
helped protect the poor from oppression. Therefore, we loved it, 
because we had been oppressed for 100 years. (Chea 2000) 
 
Indeed, to understand how and why Hou Yuon became a Communist, it is 
necessary to indicate the role played by radical currents of avant-garde thought, which, 
together with the setting of 1950s Paris, made impressionable students more receptive 
to radical trends. Paris was where Hou first encountered Marxist works (Chandler 1991, 
52). Moreover, shared experiences and study of Marxist texts in that illuminating city 
against the backdrop of wars in Indochina and Korea—a period that Jacques Vergès, 
then-president of the Association des Étudiants Coloniaux (Association for Colonial 
Students, AEC) and friend to Saloth Sar, calls “the springtime of peoples”—galvanized 
Hou and his colleagues as awakened agents of change (quoted in Chandler 1999, 52). 
Khmer intellectuals developed shared political views and established lasting bonds well 
into the heyday of the Communist movement; students met regularly to debate politics, 
art, and philosophy, and Cambodia’s position in an ever-globalizing world (Chandler 
1999, 27). Post- World War II Paris therefore served as a rare meeting ground for the 
avant-garde. 
More important than which “ism” young students espoused at this time were their 
experiences of discussing these new ideas, through which they bonded as comrades. 
After arriving in Paris in 1949, Hou Yuon settled at the Pavillon de l’Indochine (Indochina 
Pavillion) in Paris (Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer 1952a).1 Contact with others and 
shared experiences engendered the inception of radical thought for the young Khmer 
intellectuals in the French capital (Martin 1989, 103–106). As Hou’s contemporary and 
future CPK head Saloth Sar (also known as Pol Pot) recalled, “I came into contact with 
some progressive students…. I often stayed with them, and little by little they influenced 
me” (Pol Pot 1984; Xu 2001, 219). Khieu Samphan also remembered that as a student in 
Paris he “was in the same situation as many students of our country. We debated the 
future of our people and ways of realizing our goals such as national independence, 
economic progress, and prosperity for everybody. Already at that time all my activities 
had been aimed at the fulfillment of these ideals” (Pilz 1980, 13). Whether it was the 
shared experience of living abroad, or their interpretation of radical thought within the 
context of rectifying their homeland’s ills, these men coalesced around taking action 
and the fact that they could do it together. 
                                               
1 The Pavillon de l’Indochine was located in the Cité International Universitaire de Paris 
(International University City of Paris) at 59 Boulevard Jourdan in the 14th arrondissement.  
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But how did Hou become a Communist, and when did he begin to interpret his 
country’s plight as part of a global phenomenon of capitalist imperialism? A brief 
biographical note in the 1952 report by the Sureté, the French police force, states that 
Hou had “Communist sympathies” (Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer 1952b, 3). This 
note came from participation in the Cercle Marxiste (Marxist circle, hereafter Cercle), a 
secret cell within the nationalist AEK (established 1948) with links to the PCF-established 
groupes des langues (language groups, ca. 1949). Endorsed by PCF Secretary General 
Maurice Thorez, the Cercle constitutes one of four major pushes in this transformation. 
The other three are reading Marxist texts and seeing how they became useful to their 
readers, networking with Communists in Berlin, and following the corrupt politics at 
home that crushed the democratic process. 
Concerning the Cercle, Keng Vannsak (pseudonym Kolott), a radical thinker and 
student mentor who had long held that Buddhism and Hinduism had contaminated the 
purity of Khmer culture and who had ties to Parisian leftist circles (Kiernan 2007, 543–
544), was most senior among the Khmer intellectuals’ cohort. Keng and his French wife, 
whom he married in 1952, hosted student meetings at his Rue de Commerce apartment 
to organize anti-monarchist nationalist reading groups in which students found value in 
Marxism not because of its theoretical insights but insofar as it could be useful for 
obtaining independence (Smith 2014, 190–199, 236–251; Short 2004, 51, 63–64). Yet 
Marxist critiques of wealth soon rubbed off on these students, who soon developed 
suspicions of wealth and influence, particularly in the case of Cercle member Thiounn 
Mumm, a descendant of a prominent non-royal family and proponent of the AEK’s 
nationalist tendency (Tyner 2008, 46). Wealth, Cercle members believed, was merely a 
card played by those who could afford it. In an August 1952 text written by an AEK 
member, “money and rank were regarded as potions that poisoned people and 
subjected them to the monarchy”; soon afterward, the Cercle shifted further to the left 
(Sher 2004, 76). The Cercle then encouraged doctrinaire discussions, reading 
ideologically tinged materials that consisted of individual cells and preaching strict 
adherence to clandestine operations.  
Reading Marxist texts constitutes the second major factor in Hou Yuon’s conversion 
to Communism. Through reading the texts in their language of choice, and by 
interpreting them through a local cultural lens, Cercle members such as Hou were able 
to conceptualize a Marxism that fit with Cambodian realities. Although Cercle members 
conversed in Khmer, they contemplated these works in French, because some political 
terms lacked Khmer equivalents (Chandler 1999, 32–33; Tyner 2008, 91). More senior 
members mentored younger participants, with elder students like Hou Yuon and Khieu 
Samphan forming “part of [the] circle from university,” as Hu Nim recalled in 1977 (Hu 
Nim 1977, 4). The Cercle met monthly, and as PCF operative Mey Mann recalled, it 
secretly controlled the student movement (Chandler 1999, 33; Kiernan 1985, 119; Debré 
1976, 81). As a section of the PCF, the Cercle had its own Politburo and Secretariat, 
though it did not confer with the Vietnamese-led Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party 
(KPRP) because it feared harsh reprisal and disliked the Vietnamese students’ parochial 
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proposal of Indochina Federation, unity of Cambodia with Vietnam and Laos (Engelbert 
and Goscha 1995, 54). The Cercle leaders in 1950 and 1951 were PCF members Rath 
Samueoun and Ieng Sary and included recent PCF recruits Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan 
(1953–1957), and Saloth Sar as participants. Sar, who held a low rank, recalled that he 
and his colleagues dated the Cercle’s foundation to July and August 1951, though Ieng 
Sary repudiated this claim (Pol Pot 1984; Ieng Sary 1979; Xu 2001, 219). They were not 
the first Khmers to become Communists; Tep Saravouth and Sien An had “converted” to 
Communism by July 1950 (Complin 1952, 1). Saloth Sar and Ieng Sary soon followed, 
and went the next step by abandoning their studies in 1951 for politics. Ieng Sary in 
particular studied Stalin’s works and techniques for organizational structures of the 
Communist Party closely. 
Hou Yuon, by contrast, continued his academic pursuit regardless of Cercle 
participation, earning an economics doctorate in 1955. He was in the same cell as fellow 
CPK founders Ieng Sary and Saloth Sar, and their group focused on the Communist 
canon. Upon Sar’s mid-1950 return from Yugoslavia, where he worked in a “labor 
battalion” on the Zagreb highway, he joined Hou Yuon and Ieng Sary in discussing 
Lenin’s “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” Marx’s Das Kapital and The 
Communist Manifesto, Stalin’s collected works, and Mao Zedong’s La nouvelle 
démocratie and Lectures choisies des oeuvres de Mao (Chandler 1999, 26, 33; Sher 2001, 
78, 121; Short 2004, 64–65). But Cercle participants did not merely read and discuss 
Marxism; they also interpreted it through the lens of national culture, which for them 
was Khmer Buddhism. The CPK later banned Buddhism and defrocked monks, but in the 
Paris years of these participants Buddhism was still inseparable from Cambodian 
identity (Harris 2013, 53). One member of Hou’s coterie, and his onetime co-worker at 
the private Lycée Kambuboth, even viewed Buddhism as compatible with Communism: 
“There’s nothing bad about Communist theory. It is like Buddhism…[and] in compliance 
with the theory of Buddhism. In Buddhism, [one] only has enough belongings to carry 
with oneself in life” (Chea 2000). 
The third factor that pushed Hou toward Communism was his connection to 
Cambodian Communists in Berlin. In July and August 1951, he was part of a ten-member 
AEK representative youth delegation, to the International Federation of Democratic 
Youth festival in East Berlin (Ieng Sary 1951, 1; Complin 1952, 1). One of their 
instructions before arrival was to bring a Khmer flag “without the color blue,” the red 
flag of the KPRP (Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer 1951, 1). The festival was their first 
exposure to the KPRP and news of resistance against the French in Cambodia, and a 
watershed moment in the shift of the Paris Group (the Paris-educated future CPK 
founders) toward an internationalist outlook. Once there, Hou met delegates from the 
Viet Minh resistance group who gave him “a number of Communist documents,” 
including news on the latest from the anti-French nationalist movement Khmer Issarak 
and its leader Son Ngoc Thanh (alias Minh) (Chandler 1999, 35). Hou returned to France 
with brochures, photographs of Son Ngoc Minh, and “a sample of the Issarak five-
towered flag” (Chandler 1991, 55). By his return, Keng Vannsak had left Paris, but his 
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departure initiated even deeper bonds between Hou and his colleagues, with the Cercle 
relocating to Ieng Sary’s hotel room on Rue St. André des Arts in 1952 (Chandler 1991, 
53). Hou ascended to AEK leadership in December 1951 and connected it to the 
internationalist Union National des Étudiants de France (UNEF) (Service de Sécurité du 
Haut Commissariat au Cambodge 1952, 1). His rise signaled the Cercle’s seizure of the 
AEK from within (a bloc-within strategy, so to speak), as PCF members divided the AEK 
into moderate, right-wing, and leftist camps (Martin 1989, 289n2). This fissure also led 
the AEK to be openly “hostile toward the Sovereign” and augment its leftist political 
orientation, with members distributing L’Humanité (a French newspaper and the organ 
of the PCF), frequenting PCF cells, and expressing outright criticism of the association’s 
honorary president, King Norodom Sihanouk (r. 1941–1955) (Direction des Services de 
Sécurité du Haute Commission en Indochine 1953, 2). In one instance, AEK members 
decried Sihanouk’s suppression of opposition parties, demanding that he renounce his 
honorary title (Martin 1989, 104; Huoth 1952). Sihanouk’s continued disruption of the 
electoral process, both before and after Cambodia’s 1953 independence, ultimately 
pushed the Cercle toward embracing Communism as its guiding principle. 
Politics on the home front constitute the fourth major factor that pushed Hou 
toward Communism. Three important developments constituted this push. In the first, 
Sihanouk dissolved the National Assembly in January 1949 and ruled by imperial decree, 
which angered a Democratic Party that had lobbied for a popular vote (Sar 1952, 39; 
Thion and Kiernan 1981, 357; Osborne 1994, 63–66). The tipping point was the January 
1950 assassination of Democrat leader Ieu Kouess by an associate of Sihanouk’s uncle, 
Norodom Norindeth, which left Khmer students with few political options. The 
Democrats continued their push for elections, which they gained in 1951, and in May 
1952 anti-Sihanouk demonstrations among students in Cambodia gave indications that 
the monarchy could no longer ignore calls for reform. From Paris, Hou penned a letter in 
which he lauded the demonstrators’ efforts, situating their protests in a global context: 
“These positive developments have become normal throughout the world, whether in 
the European countries or the Asian ones, and especially in the countries where 
independence is being sought” (Kiernan 1985, 121). The next development was the 
French position on Sihanouk, which cast him as the only hope for political stability and, 
ultimately, infuriated the pro-democracy Paris group. As French military commander 
General Pierre de Langlade declared, “Democracy had no hope [here]…. The 
parliamentary experiment has failed…. The Sovereign remains the only person capable 
of giving Cambodia political direction…. [He is] heir to the…mystique of the God-Kings, 
who for thousands of years have guided the destinies of the land…. Everything in this 
country has to be done by the King” (Short 2004, 80). Sihanouk thus had unchecked 
power, and again dissolved the National Assembly in a coup d’état on June 15, 1952 
(Extrait de BQR 1953, 2–4). 
Sihanouk’s corruption pushed Hou and many of his Paris comrades to embrace the 
PCF’s Stalinism and dogmatism (and emphasis on clandestine operation and 
organization). In response to Sihanouk’s coup, Keng Vannsak levied harsh condemnation 
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in a 1952 issue of the AEK publication Khemara nisut (Khmer student), in which he 
declared: 
 
We, Khmer students of the AEK, consider that Your Majesty has acted 
illegally…and that the policy of the Throne…will inevitably lead our 
Khmer Motherland into an abyss of perpetual slavery…. In your message 
to the nation, [you said that] Cambodia faces ever greater dangers…. 
What should the people think when Your Majesty’s Palace has become 
a lobby for dishonest dealings which place within your hands the riches 
of the country and the people?... Corruption in our country stems from 
the Throne and spreads down to the humblest officials. The French 
oppress the whole country, the King trades his Crown, the Palace and its 
parasites suck the people’s blood…. These are the main causes of our 
country’s critical situation today…. Your Majesty has sought to divide 
the nation in two: the royalists, and those who struggle for 
independence. [Your] policy is to set Khmers against Khmers. (“Lettre de 
l’Association des Étudiants Khmers en France à Sa Majesté Norodom 
Syhanouk [sic], Roi du Cambodge” 1952; see also Archives Nationales 
d’Outre Mer 1952c, 3–5) 
 
Yet Cercle members realized the limits of theory (their two years in Paris had not 
brought Cambodia closer to reform), and as Sihanouk disbanded the AEK in 1953, they 
took a radical turn, forming the Communist Union des Étudiants Khmers on November 
26, 1953 (Debord 1953, 1). As Khieu Samphan, who assumed UEK leadership in 1957 
and linked it to the KPRP’s Phnom Penh branch, recalled, “My studies as well as my 
experiences convinced me that the only way of implementing our ideals in general, and 
of building up our backward agriculture in particular, is socialism. Thus, I became a 
communist. I did so out of objective conviction and not out of daydreaming” (Pilz 1980). 
Indeed, Sihanouk’s 1952 dissolution of the Democrat-led assembly exacerbated the 
Paris Groups’ radicalization, with students flocking en masse to join the PCF (Chandler 
1991, 8). The PCF owed its appeal to General Secretary Thorez, a charismatic orator who 
had developed a personality cult of his own (Chandler 1999, 25). But in 1950 Thorez 
suffered a stroke and left the country for medical treatment. An intra-party struggle for 
power culminated in purges, and many Cambodians in France, including Hou, were 
swept along by a Stalinist wave as the PCF’s rigid disciplinary line instilled in members a 
sense of purpose and direction (Chandler 1999, 33, 35). Hou learned the effectiveness of 
staying out of sight and mind, especially in light of the French government’s crackdown 
on scholarship student participation in Parisian leftist groups (Sher 2004, 30; Etcheson 
1984, 174). By 1952, Hou “vowed a lifelong commitment” to Communism, and he never 
looked back (Chandler 1999, 28). 
A residual effect of the fourth push was the process whereby leftist Khmer 
intellectuals like Hou turned their attention to bringing actual change to Cambodia. As 
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Keng Vannsak stated in an interview, “We wanted to take power and believed that we 
could do so only with popular support, which necessarily means violence. We opposed 
the PCF’s view that we could come to power through universal suffrage” (Martin 1989, 
105). Sar returned to Cambodia in 1953 to take up a regional position as cell secretary in 
the KPRP, yet frustration mounted among cadres, who merely tolerated rather than 
embraced Hanoi’s leadership over the Cambodian Working Bureau in eastern Cambodia, 
and awaited directives on what to do next (Chandler 1999, 27–28; Mosyakov 2004, 45–
48). In Paris, the PCF discarded Stalinism; its members had grown tired of Soviet and 
Vietnamese support of their nemesis Sihanouk. As Keng Vannsak, who had returned to 
Paris to finish his invention, the Khmer typewriter, elaborated, “At the beginning, we 
were very Stalinist…. We turned toward China in the late 1950s because the Russians 
were playing the Sihanouk card and neglecting us…. When everyone began to criticize 
Stalin, we became Maoists” (Martin 1989, 105–106; Sher 2001, 119). Why? One answer 
is because Soviet de-Stalinization and “revisionism” propelled many radical students in 
Paris toward looking to Communist China for answers to crises in Cambodia. The other is 
that Maoism, borne of the Chinese revolutionary experience, stressed practice over 
dogmatism, discarded the Eurocentrism inherent in Marxism, and contained 
emancipatory features. The primacy it placed on practice must have had an influence on 
Hou, who undoubtedly took a practical approach to Marxist concepts and categories in 
his own written work. In addition, Marxism’s liberating possibility lay in accounting for 
Cambodia’s national experience. Accordingly, Hou Yuon sought to challenge the 
corruption of the ruling government in Cambodia by taking first an academic, then a 
political, route to reform in his homeland. As the next section shows, his dissertation 
represents an important formative stage in the Cambodian intellectuals’ radical vision 
for their homeland. 
 
Countryside Surrounds the Cities: Hou Yuon’s Doctoral Dissertation (1955) 
 
Hou Yuon defended his dissertation at the Université de Paris on February 14, 1955. Hou 
drew from a wide range of sources, from area specialists like Jean Chesneaux, Jean 
Ajalbert, and Paul Sebac to Cambodian leftist academic Phung Ton (Hou 1955, 279–280), 
and focused on Cambodia’s rural sector, emphasizing peasant emancipation and 
collective work. His thesis came out at a time when Communist China had followed 
Soviet prioritization of heavy industry, which influenced him to regard the Soviet 
Union’s second Five-Year Plan’s response “to peasant needs…by studying the possibility 
of, encouraging, or creating Machine Tractor Stations” (Hou 1955, 228). Accordingly, 
Hou’s “careful research” represents a “radical analysis” of the Cambodian countryside, 
making several novel suggestions to reform its economy around improving peasants’ 
living and working standards (Heder 2004, 72). After Hou returned to Cambodia, he 
expanded upon his dissertation in his 1964 book Banha sahakor. But it was his 
dissertation, which identifies real problems in the rural sector—usury, poverty, 
exploitation, inter alia—through the lens of Marxism, that struck a sympathetic chord 
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with his protégés Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim, whose own doctoral dissertations 
reflected Hou’s lasting influence (Heder 2004, 59; Suong 2013, 72). Khieu Samphan’s 
economics dissertation, in particular, expanded on Hou’s study in an overall view of 
Cambodia’s national production (Becker 1998, 79). 
This section examines five central themes in Hou’s work that engage with Marxist 
concepts with an eye to applying them to Cambodia’s concrete realities: (1) the nature 
of Cambodia’s rural-urban divide and the socioeconomic inequity that consumerism and 
foreign dependency had wrought as a result (the capitalist mode of production and 
state monopoly capitalism); (2) state-supported (as the state represents majority rather 
than minority interests) autonomous development whereby peasants could organize 
economic productivity themselves (democratic centralism); (3) Cambodia’s rural classes 
and peasant voluntarism (the agrarian question); (4) peasant organizations in the form 
of “mutual aid teams,” but without the ultimate goal of state upheaval (the question of 
cooperatives); and (5) modernization of Cambodia’s productive forces and the freeing of 
the peasantry from usury and capitalist exploitation (the theory of productive forces). 
Hou’s proposals provide us with a telling example of his engagement with Marxist 
concepts at the time, and his assessment of the status of the various classes in 
semicolonial, semifeudal Cambodia leads to his conclusion that the peasantry is integral 
to national welfare.  
 
Cambodia’s Agrarian Question 
 
The primacy that Hou places on the agrarian question as a prelude to any changes, 
above all, yields his most important proposals: an agrarian policy in which triumphing 
over seasonal limitations with human will was a powerful variable; and emphases on 
emancipation, collective work, and struggle against exploitation. For this reason, 
something must be said about the agrarian question before Hou related it to 
Cambodia’s rural-urban dichotomy. For Marx, and then Engels, the agrarian question 
relates partially to conditions in late nineteenth-century Russia. Earlier on, the debate 
was over whether peasants constituted a reactionary, counterrevolutionary force that 
might impede the achievement of socialism, or a significant body with the potential to 
contribute significantly to a proletarian revolution. Marx famously held that industrial 
workers’ collective action would initiate a self-realization of the need for revolutionary 
change. The proletariat was therefore the key to overcoming capitalism, because only 
the alienated industrial workers would recognize their exploitation and affect change 
through collective action. Accordingly, Marx held little hope that the peasants could 
self-realize their exploitation and be allies, though he was receptive to working across 
classes in a worker-peasant alliance. Thus for Marx, the peasantry alone constituted a 
reactionary force. 
Importantly, Marx studied events in Russia, which shed light for many, Hou 
included, on how Marxism could take shape in nations lacking a significant industrial 
proletariat. Scholarship is inconclusive regarding Marx’s hope for early Russian collective 
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farms. However, Marx vehemently opposed any notion of the vanguard, positing that 
revolutionary change could occur only through self-realization and collective action, not 
the workings of an intellectual cabal. In this vein, Marx was vocally skeptical that 
agricultural cooperatives could serve as substitutes for industrial factories. Marx noted 
that the mir (also known as selskoye obshchestvo or obshchina, Russian peasant 
collectives that practiced collective liability, periodical land redistribution, and shared 
ownership) was tending toward extinction (Marx [1877] 1968). Yet Marx also recognized 
a communistic consciousness in peasant collectives (Marx [1881] 1983). It is no wonder, 
then, that because of the absence of a real bourgeoisie to overthrow, or capitalism to 
overcome, in a predominantly feudal Russia, that some observers favored the latter 
perspective over the former.2 
In Hou’s proposals, we discover plans informed by a creative, malleable, and 
practical application of Marxist concepts to the Cambodian reality that underpinned CPK 
policies more than a decade later, though Pol Pot took them to new and terrifying 
extremes in 1975; Yuon’s criticism of Pol Pot that year led to his execution (Sher 2001, 
72, 83–85; Chandler and Kiernan 1983, 178–179). Central to Hou’s argument for reform 
is his diagnosis of an unequal relationship—a dependency-theory take on state 
monopoly capitalism—and his recommendations for its replacement with one that gave 
the poorer strata a fighting chance to improve their lot. Dependency theory held that 
the world’s poorer countries constituted a “periphery” wherein their respective 
                                               
2 Russian observers envisioned a European socialist future and not some “atavistic agrarian 
communal model,” endeavoring to adapt Marxism to local conditions and, thus, break from 
Marx’s perspective on the peasantry (Kimball 1973, 491). Narodist (Russian populist) Nikolay 
Chernyshevsky (1828–1889) disregarded the mir as a model of socialism, but combined with 
advanced technology, it could provide a means by which to pass into a new phase of 
development (Marx and Engels 1990, 491). Viktor Chernov (1873–1952) and Georgi Plekhanov 
(1856–1918) held hope for a proletarian-led socialist revolution in which peasants could play a 
role, and grounded a populist vision for socialist revolution in Russian realities, respectively 
(Trapeznik 1997, 44–45; Harding 2009, 34). Pyotr Lavrov (1823–1900), an influential ideologist on 
the then-fledgling Russian revolutionary movement, recognized Russian particularities and called 
for Russia to “rejoin European civilization in the quest for the socialist future” (Kimball 1971, 29). 
Others held that the mir could substitute for industrial proletarian factories, tracing its position 
back to Marx’s understanding of, among others, alienation (transformation of labor into power) 
and self-reliance. Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876) advocated for collective anarchism, a brand of 
socialism that seeks the abolition of the state and private property, and regarded the state’s 
existence as symptomatic of human alienation per Marx’s and Engel’s teachings (Harding 2009, 
107). As the Russian Revolution proceeded, the debate shifted to one on the relationship 
between industry and agriculture rather than between rural and urban. Lenin and Alexander V. 
Chaynov disagreed over the direction of change in the Russian agricultural sector (capitalism 
versus “vertical integration” from production to sale) (Huang, Yuan, and Peng 2012, 140). Lenin 
broke from Marx, stressing the vanguard’s role and, effectively, overturned the dialectics of 
Marx’s understanding of revolution. “Marxist-Leninism” soon became the CPK’s ideological basis 
as it fashioned its revolutionary approach, regardless of the fact that it was, essentially, the 
opposite of what Marx promoted. 
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economies were pegged to, and thus unable to develop from, the world’s wealthy “core” 
nations.3 Marx and Engels noted that in creating large cities and increasing the urban 
population relative to the rural one, the bourgeoisie had “made the country dependent 
on the towns [and] made barbarian and semi-underdeveloped countries dependent on 
the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West” 
(1964, 65). This was indeed the case in Cambodia, where France had prioritized 
constructing its protectorate around a small, French-educated elite, with the economy 
structured to produce surpluses of rice and rubber. 
Colonial domination had initiated a profound, though very slow, readjustment of 
the relationship between political powers and social forces in an example of state 
monopoly capitalism. In acquiring the collaboration of the traditional civil servants and 
endowing the rural authorities (mehsrok and mehkhom) with increased powers, the 
colonial administration damaged the protective relations and reciprocal obligations 
through which authority was exercised in Khmer countries. The misappropriation and 
exactions of the new elite of bureaucrats, the increase in taxes, the expansion of 
merchant agriculture along the river, and the indebtedness in rural areas triggered the 
first agrarian tensions (Brocheux and Hemery 2011, 285). Such vestiges of French 
colonialism persisted after Cambodian independence in 1953 to reduce the Cambodian 
countryside, according to Hou, to a semifeudal state and prevent its agricultural sectors 
from sustainable development on a more equitable basis (Hou 1955, 24–25). Hou 
contends that despite growth in commercial agriculture in Cambodia, with farmers 
producing surplus for export, agriculture was “enmeshed in a dense network of feudal 
and precapitalist relations…[which] gives the Cambodian economy its semifeudal and 
semicolonial character” (Hou 1955, 23–24). Although Hou’s assessment of the rural 
sector as semifeudal from the colonial period until the 1940s was accurate, by the 1950s 
it was somewhat of a stretch, especially when compared to Cambodia’s neighbors’ 
economic situations (Hou’s statistical data of Cambodia, after all, was from 1949 to 1951) 
(Hou 1955, 279). 
 
Between Cores and Peripheries 
 
Hou tackles the stark rural-urban divide, which he characterizes in Marxist dependency 
theory terms as an unequal relationship between cores (cities) and peripheries (rural 
areas). Hou’s position mirrors the position of Samir Amin, who was also an influence on 
Samphan. Amin held that precapitalist (Third World) economies were integrated forcibly 
into a world market by Euro-American capitalist imperialism to supply inexpensive labor 
in service to foreign interests. The principal contradiction of this international capitalist 
system was thus between monopoly capital as represented by towns (cores), and the 
                                               
3 French-Egyptian Marxist economist Samir Amin argued that, globally, the principal 
contradiction within this capitalist-imperialist system was between monopoly capital and the 
over-exploited masses (Amin 1977, 109). The solution was to break from this globalized economy 
and develop socialism autonomously. 
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over-exploited peripheries (Amin 1957, 9, 139–141). At the center of this imbalanced 
system were cities, which for Hou represented epicenters of market domination and 
“pumps that drain away the vitality of the rural areas” (Hou 1955, 192–193). Marx and 
Engels had discussed the rural-urban divide in their writings, intimating that the town 
represented the “conception of the population, of the instruments of production, of 
capital, of pleasures, of needs, while the country demonstrates just the opposite fact, 
isolation and separation” (1970, 68–69). The resulting “antagonism” between towns and 
countryside was survived by a framework of private property that entrenched views of 
who was urbanite versus countryman. Hou’s position reflects a similar outlook. On a 
macro scale, exploitation by the global market for resources from the world’s 
peripheries (underdeveloped, newly independent nations), both human and natural, 
prevented forward progression and forced underdeveloped countries like Cambodia 
into a “cyclical phenomenon” (Amin 1957, 1–9). Hou’s homeland thus remained poor 
even with independence from France in 1953. Cambodia’s hasty integration into the 
global market accounted for neither its economic development nor affordable 
commodities for the average Cambodian. The result was Cambodia’s entrenchment in a 
capitalist world order in which its economic and industrial fate was inextricable from the 
perpetuation of commodity and capital production for export and outside profit. 
Accordingly, Hou’s critique of towns (cores)—the principal sites of this ongoing 
unilateral exchange—concerns productivity. For Marx, it was necessary for capitalism to 
mature fully as a precondition for the self-awareness of an alienated existence; then the 
proletariat could affect change and the peasants would follow along: “Only the fall of 
the capitalist can help the peasant,” Marx urged, and “only an anti-capitalist, a 
proletarian government can end his economic misery, his social degradation” (Hammen 
1977, 684). But in China and the global South, where there was no appreciable 
proletariat, vanguards tried to lead peasants to revolution. Hou avoided explicit mention 
of a vanguard likely out of fear of drawing too much attention to his activities in 
progressive intellectual circles, which might have compromised his scholarship and 
employment prospects back in Cambodia. He therefore promoted the contradictory 
term “agricultural proletariat” to address the lack of a sizable industrial proletariat in 
Cambodia and to account for the nature of this class, which did not own property. It was 
important to categorize this group as such because they were full-time wageworkers 
employed by what he classifies as a semifeudal agricultural enterprise. Although Hou 
avoids weighing the revolutionary potential of Cambodia’s agricultural proletariat, he 
highlights their productivity despite adversity and their willpower as important variables 
to consider in reframing and reforming the Cambodian rural economy’s nature and form. 
 
Unequal Exchange and Production 
 
Next, Hou argues that Cambodia’s agricultural sector supplied cities with necessary 
commodities, but cities and market towns only consumed or exported rather than 
producing for the countryside. This argument mirrors Marx’s recognition that a 
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fundamental contradiction in capitalism is that of workers, who are at once producers 
and consumers. Capitalists kept wages low yet expected workers to produce. In 
Cambodia’s economic system, products were either exported for or consumed by only 
the wealthy, mostly foreign, few at the expense of the majority population. This process 
represented a “two way circulation” of imports that 
 
flows from the great Cholon [Ho Chi Minh City] business houses and 
branches out into the whole country, first to the small wholesale houses 
that compose the secondary arteries, and then to small retailers, whose 
thatch shops may even be established at the corner of two ricefield 
embankments, completing the arterial network. These arteries…convey 
imported products out to the most remote parts of [Cambodia’s] 
countryside, but they also drain away all the paddy that remains in 
peasant and smallholder hands, and delivers it first to the small 
wholesale merchant in the provincial center, and finally, due to the 
organization of transport, connects the entire wholesale rice trade to 
the shops of the big Cholon importers where the paddy is delivered for 
export, ending the circulation and closing the trade cycle. (Hou 1955, 
192–193) 
 
The Cambodian market, moreover, was “such that the peasant is robbed when he 
sells his product and is held at ransom when he buys the products that he needs. All of 
[Cambodia’s] commerce is in the hands of foreign monopolies, and there are 
middlemen at every level of the organization and distribution of merchandise and credit” 
(Hou 1955, 192). This dual system of exploitation pillaged peasants at every level, 
thereby widening the gap of socioeconomic inequity in Cambodia’s rural sector. 
Indeed, agricultural yields, particularly in rice, were the lifeblood of the already 
rural poor strata, but what little living they could generate for themselves was erased by 
the unequal rural-urban exchange and the absence of modern technology. While 
Cambodian soil was extremely poor, most poor peasants did not own their own land 
and, thus, “remained [poor] even while the population quadrupled in the period 1900–
50” (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 31–32; see also Zhou 1964, 43–44). Landlords and wealthy 
farmers had forced poor peasants to depend on sharecropping, paying debts in kind, or 
selling their labor outright to make even the most modest ends meet.  Hou describes 
how under agrarian capitalism, agriculture in its “traditional form of family farming” had 
degraded to ruin in service to large capitalist exploitation, as agricultural prices 
“established on the market” did not allow small producers to keep some of their 
product to sustain themselves (Hou 1955, 191–192). “From that moment began the 
rural exodus,” Hou continues, as Cambodia “was depopulated, and the city now bustles 
with workers. The private farmers will augment the industrial ‘reserve army’ in the cities, 
while the rest is transformed into a rural proletariat” (Hou 1955, 210). Hou paints a 
picture of a destitute and indebted Cambodian peasantry. He acknowledges that 
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landlordism was not rampant in Cambodia like in Vietnam or China, and that nearly all 
farmers held some land, but notes that plots were so minuscule that peasants could not 
conceivably sustain themselves by tilling them. Already constrained by French-imposed 
taxes and below-market value paid by merchants for their product, peasants could 
afford neither fertilizers nor modern equipment, and were forced thus to borrow money 
at impossible rates and to repay debts (Becker 1998, 78–79). 
Recently, scholars have contested Hou’s appraisal of class stratification and 
polarization in Cambodia. Critics include Steve Heder, who charges that Hou 
exaggerates the situation “in part on account of [his] political convictions and hopes” 
(2004, 74). Heder claims that Cambodia was “only beginning to display class 
stratification…agricultural and non-agricultural working classes comprised a mere 4 per 
cent of the active work force; practically the whole of the upper class strata comprised 
civil servants or petty traders” (Heder 2004, 74, 206n46) and challenges Hou’s 
breakdown of the rural sector into five classes of peasants. Jean Delvert’s study of 
Battambang, Prey Veng, and Svay Rieng notes that some areas were exceptional in that 
landlord-tenant conflict existed, which is why they were attractive sites for the CPK to 
manipulate peasant unrest. He concludes, however, that Cambodian peasant society 
was “a democracy of small owner-tillers, under the commercial domination of the 
Chinese and at a mediocre standard of living,” thus it experienced “no agrarian problem” 
(Delvert 1961, 509; see also Willmott 1981, 221). William Willmot agrees, claiming that 
Hou exaggerated the number of poor peasants and proprietors, and that there was 
“little social basis for rural discontent (except in pockets) when the [CPK] began to 
organize the peasantry in the Kampuchean revolution” (Willmott 1981, 224). May 
Ebihara’s ethnographic study of Svay village reveals that although Hou is correct that 
most peasants neither lived comfortably nor owned mid-to-large plots (less than a 
hectare, or under 2.5 acres, per household), traditional sharecropping arrangements 
were “mutually beneficial [and] not as exploitative rent extracted by the rich from the 
poor” (Ebihara 1968, 196). Alexander Hinton elaborates that one could describe life in 
this hamlet as containing “an ethos of egalitarianism, a tradition of mutual aid, and a 
lack of significant class stratification” (Hinton 2005, 57). 4  Thus, although class 
stratification was a very real problem, its severity in Cambodia’s rural sector paled in 
comparison to the situations in China and Vietnam (Frieson 1988, 424). Despite such 
criticisms, however, Hou rightly condemns the effects of marketization on Cambodia’s 
rural sector, which tied peasants’ fates either to outsider interests or to internal 
feudalistic enterprises, forcing them to rely on surpluses or paying usurers for land costs 
(Hou 1955, 20). 
 
 
                                               
4 In Sobay, for example, socioeconomic categories simply “did not exist” by 1960, though there 
were metrics of differentiation such as “those who have” (neak mean), “those who have enough” 
(neak kuorsâm), the poor (neak krâ), and the super impoverished (neak toal/ neak toal krâ) 
(Ljunggren 1993, 161; Hinton, 2005, 57).  
Matthew Galway 
Cross-Currents 31 | 144 
State-sponsored Autonomous Development 
 
Hou argues that peasants also could not increase productivity because their tools and 
techniques were “primitive and archaic” (Hou 1955, 190–193). First, rather than 
dismissing them as lazy or uncivilized, the state should equip them with the proper 
materials to increase production and, vicariously, their standard of living. Marx and 
Engels once proposed a theory of productive forces wherein true liberation (social 
change) was achieved through technological advancement (technical change).5 Hou’s 
perspective, by contrast, places the responsibility of equipping peasants with modern 
tools and better working and living conditions on the state. Only the Cambodian state’s 
spearheading of this initiative could maximize production and minimize the suffering of 
poor peasants and semi-proletarians—the two lowest strata. Peasants would then be 
free from repression and exploitation by foreign market dominance and debt bondage 
to landlords and rich peasants (Hou 1955, 228). 
Second, Hou urges Sihanouk’s government, as representative of the majority will, 
to intervene and ensure the peasants’ quality of life based on their requirements. In this 
sense, peasants themselves could have a voice in shaping post-independence, rural 
Cambodian society, and the state could use its power to break the existing status quo. 
Hou’s proposal, less democratic centralism in a purely Leninist sense—his goal was not 
to overthrow the state at this immediate stage—emphasizes the peasants gaining more 
of a say in how to govern their sector according to their needs. Instead of a rigid 
interpretation of democratic centralism, Hou clearly recognizes that certain aspects 
were not politically expedient at that time. But the core essence of the concept, the 
people’s right to determine their own activity and to be the ones to shape it, remains 
largely intact (albeit with peasants instead of a classical proletariat) (Tyner 2017, 75–82). 
For Hou, one way to raise peasants’ living standards was to improve their access to 
modern farming technologies, particularly through establishing Machine Tractor 
Stations (MTS) not unlike the stations in Soviet kolkhozes (collective farms). Hou 
elaborated on the importance of technology in rural Cambodia, stating that Cambodia 
“cannot ignore modern technology, which must be applied in one way or another in 
agriculture” because modern technology brought farmers modern techniques that could 
augment their productive capacity and potential (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 139). 
Cooperative tool use could ultimately reverse low production yields in rural Cambodia, 
because it gave peasants “full use of scientific and technological methods, 
and…increase[d] the standard of living of the workers” (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 139). 
                                               
5As they intimated, “Slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine and the mule and 
spinning-jenny, serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture, and that, in general, 
people cannot be liberated as long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, housing and 
clothing in adequate quality and quantity. ‘Liberation’ is a historical and not a mental act, and it is 
brought about by historical conditions, the development of industry, commerce, agriculture, the 
conditions of intercourse” (Marx and Engels, 1970, 61). 
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As for a counterbalance to foreign exploitation, Hou proposes that peasants’ 
working spirit would liberate Cambodia from dependency and strengthen the national 
economy. He maintains that the whole national economy lies in the peasant’s “life and 
his strength,” and that Cambodia’s transformation from a “semifeudal and semicolonial 
economy…into a prosperous national economy…can only be done on the basis of 
modernization and technological development, relying on their [the peasants’] immense 
potential strength both economic and human” (Hou 1955, 4). Hou foregrounds peasants’ 
will as a determining factor in Cambodia’s true sovereignty. Because farmers—whom 
Hou calls the prolétariat agricole—are familiar with organized or collective labor and 
accepted a labor organization “on the basis of a united leadership” that defends their 
interests, Hou prophesies that peasants will “use the land rationally [and] start various 
crops on land that suits them,” which he predicted would reverse their suffering (Hou 
1955, 253). Although Hou may have supported the idea of an overthrow of the entire 
order in Cambodia in private, it is not present in his dissertation. He either believed in 
fixing the system internally through a bloc within strategy, or feared losing his 
Cambodian government bursary for such antigovernment sentiments (he had lost it 
before, recovering it only in January 1953) (Hou 1955, 253). 
 
Cambodia’s Rural Classes 
 
Hou then presents a complex analysis of the classes in Cambodian rural society. “A 
central aspect of a revolutionary ideology,” historian William Willmott notes, “is the 
analysis of the society to estimate the revolutionary potential of its various classes. 
While many Marxists would insist that the ideology flows from the analysis…the two 
[are] dialectically related, for the ideology also determines the analysis to a large extent” 
(1981, 210). This relationship is evident in Hou’s assessment. Like Marx and Engels, Hou 
regards peasants as victims of the same bourgeois capitalist exploitation as the urban 
proletariat. Although classical Marxism cautions that the peasantry could stand in 
opposition to its own proletarianization, thereby preventing socialism’s realization, 
Marx and Engels were “generally ready to side with any groups” against an exploitative 
government and economic system. In predominantly agricultural countries, they 
recognized, “an appeal to the rural masses” was necessary (Hammen 1977, 702). An 
“emerging proletariat” might even take the reins of the Communist movement, because 
workers in underdeveloped countries might respond more radically and responsively to 
their plight than workers in more developed locales (Hammen 1977, 681–682). Hou is 
aware of this issue, noting that “no study on this [the peasant classes] question in 
Cambodia” exists, and such a study is “delicate because Cambodian agriculture is 
entangled in a dense network of feudal and precapitalist relations” (Hou 1955, 150–151). 
Hou divides the Cambodian countryside into five social categories: (1) les propriétaires 
(landlords)—who hold land of 10 and 50 hectares (about 24.7 and 123.5 acres) in size, 
form part of the feudal class, and rather than work the land, earn by renting, 
sharecropping, or employing debt bondsmen; (2) les paysans riches (rich peasants)—
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landowners who own but do not work land, contain bourgeois connections, and have 
agricultural equipment and important working capital; (3) les paysans moyens (middle 
peasants)—a stratum that owns agricultural equipment, does not exploit the labor of 
others consistently, but also does not sell their labor (Hou says that this class is part of 
the petty bourgeoisie); (4) les paysans pauvres (poor peasants)—the largest and most 
complex group, who lack agricultural equipment, some have no land at all, and many 
either rent land or are exploited by paying rent and interest on debts through selling 
their labor; and (5) le semi-prolétariat (the semi-proletariat)—permanent agricultural 
workers who are partial tenants, poor peasants, landless peasants, and debt bondsmen 
from impoverished peasant families (all of whom are poor or exploited by usury) (Hou 
1955, 150–159). 
 
Mutual Aid Teams 
 
Hou proposes that the solution to the unequal distribution of wealth, opportunity, and 
tools to cultivate lands was for peasants to organize themselves into “mutual aid teams” 
in which all land and means of production that belonged to peasants would be “put 
toward the cooperative and used communally” (Hou 1955, 252). Peasants must organize, 
he urges, lest they “have no power, and not have complete capacity to defend their 
standard of living” (Hou 1955, 252). By organizing into mutual aid teams, Hou contends, 
the peasants will obtain real collective power and gain the “capacity and opportunity to 
defend and build their standard of living into one of happiness and dignity” (Hou 1955, 
250). Thus, mutual aid teams—the union of all peasant groups into a cooperative, 
emancipatory effort to improve rural economic life—required participation across 
socioeconomic lines. 
This particular proposal by Hou recalls the Marxist question of cooperatives. Marx 
argued that “however excellent in principle and however useful in practice, cooperative 
labor, if kept within the narrow circle of the casual efforts of private workmen, will 
never be able to arrest the growth in geometrical progression of monopoly, to free the 
masses, nor even to perceptibly lighten the burden of their miseries” (Marx [1864] 
2000). Hou, by contrast, holds that the more mutual aid teams, the “greater the mode 
of production, the more abundant the harvest” (Hou 1955, 253). He states: 
 
[Although] private ownership of the means of production remains…the 
difference with the individual farm is that the work is done collectively. 
Each member of the group retains its individual operation; he may 
augment or discard his product as he wants. When he goes to 
work…with another member of the group, he brings with him his own 
tools. [Mutual aid teams] therefore pool production resources 
temporarily for the accomplishment of a specific job. Group participants 
are not paid.... At the end of the day, everyone goes home...carrying 
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with him his equipment. And the cycle continues under the same 
principle. (Hou 1955, 249–250) 
 
As is evident, Hou diverges from Marx’s position on the utility of cooperatives. 
Hou’s state-assisted mutual aid teams were, of course, modeled after the Soviet MTS. 
Yet the goal was the same nonetheless: Hou’s target aim was to destroy modern 
capitalism and semifeudalism, but through collective production. Aid teams were to be 
“semi-socialist” and “semi-mechanical,” whereby land, draft animals, and tools became 
shared properties available for everyone’s use (Hou 1955, 250). The result, then, would 
be that peasants pooled their production resources for the accomplishment of a 
common goal, and could return from work with their own equipment in tow with a view 
to working collectively the next day. 
 
The Modernization of Cambodia’s Productive Forces 
 
Hou Yuon concludes his dissertation with a proposal for Cambodia to normalize trade 
relations with Communist China and North Vietnam, and somewhat idealistically (even 
the CPK relied on Chinese aid), for the country to become economically self-sufficient 
(Mertha 2014; Mosyakov 2004). Regarding the latter idea, onetime managing director of 
the colonial finance house Paul Bernard was a major influence on Hou’s proposal (Hou 
1955, 279).6 Bernard argued that Indochina’s economy ought to be its own market to 
satisfy its own needs, and peasants ought to have a decent standard of living (Hardy 
1998, 817): 
 
The point of industrializing Indochina is to equip the colony once and for 
all such that it can, alone, constitute an independent economic entity, 
able to produce everything necessary for its population to live and 
improve its lot…. We aim to turn this country, by means of its full 
industrial development, into a “living body,” having a “harmonious 
equilibrium between the trunk and limbs,” a veritable second-
metropole, forming an economic unit more or less distinct from that of 
France. (Bernard 1938, 15) 
 
Although Bernard was writing in the 1930s, long before independence in 1953, his 
argument rang true even in independent Cambodia: independence from French colonial 
rule neither resulted in Cambodia’s economic independence, nor elevated the peasants’ 
standard of living. The complete abolition of feudal production, Hou argued, was sine 
qua non for land products to go to those who grow them. Only then could the “potential 
strengths of the campaigns [of national emancipation] be freed from feudal remnants 
and the vestiges of colonialism, establishing the necessary industrial conditions and 
                                               
6 Bernard directed La Société Financière Française et Coloniale (SFFC, Colonial Finance Company). 
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bases for the country’s edification” (Hou 1955, 273). Any assistance, he argues, “must 
contribute to the development of our national independence, industries, and agriculture, 
and must not be accompanied by grants of economic or military privileges of any kind” 
(Hou 1955, 273). No matter what, Hou concludes, Cambodia “must count principally on 
its own forces. It has everything to gain in peace and everything to lose in war” (Hou 
1955, 276). 
Hou then presents three avenues for the cultivation of the necessary capital to 
achieve his vision of a truly independent Cambodia: (1) patriotic and liberated people 
working strenuously to break the chains of feudal and semifeudal relations; (2) 
normalized economic relations between all countries on the principles of equality and 
mutual interest, including the reestablishment of commercial relations with Communist 
China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; and (3) international aid organizations, 
with a view to improving the nation’s agricultural development (Hou 1955, 275–276). In 
these avenues, Hou’s position on internationalism, or his interpretation thereof, reveals 
itself: 
 
[Our problem] is serious and not unique to Cambodia but common to all 
underdeveloped countries. They cannot appeal to foreign capital 
without compromising their independence and freedom of which they 
are justifiably jealous because they are dearly acquired…. They fear 
foreign control over important sectors of their economy.... [But] corrupt 
or reactionary cliques’ domination could be overthrown by the people if 
there were no outside assistance to consolidate their dominant 
positions. (Hou 1955, 274) 
 
Evidently, Hou saw Cambodia as a nation among many nations resisting foreign 
capitalist domination, and its people as part of a larger movement to cast out the 
corrupt and exploitative few for the good of the many. Cambodia therefore had to 
solidify economic ties with nonaligned nations, Communist China and Vietnam 
particularly, on the principle of mutual interest rather than the U.S. or Soviet norm of 
tailoring economic ties with nations friendly to their own, geopolitical interests. 
Although Hou also suggests, rather antithetically, that international aid organizations 
could play a role—a position that his protégés Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim did not 
share—he is cautious in stating that such organizations would not operate in a way that 
was detrimental to Cambodian farmers. Hou does not elaborate much on how this role 
would take shape, but it is clear that his approach reflects the larger anticolonial wave 
of the era, though he advocates for peace instead of violence, likely to avoid raising 
suspicion from his benefactors back home (Sher 2004, 207). 
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The Cooperative Question 
 
Hou Yuon expanded on this proposal nearly a decade later in Banha sahakor, which was 
a “blueprint for a ‘United Front’ between Communists and anti-imperialists” (Kiernan 
and Boua 1982, 134). He urged that a united front against American imperialism was 
required for the development of cooperatives with an emphasis on modernization. 
Sihanouk’s modest socialist economic reforms (the rejection of U.S. aid, growth of 
national capitalism, and improved conditions for farmers and workers) had spun off 
course. Thus Hou identifies both “the main contradiction…between the whole Khmer 
nation and the American imperialists” and an “internal contradiction” between 
oppressive and oppressed classes (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 136–137). If unresolved, Hou 
cautions, these two contradictions would undermine any gains from Sihanouk’s recent 
reforms. The solution to rural problems was, once again, to modernize the productive 
forces and free the peasantry from usury and capitalist exploitation.  
Hou calls for a system of cooperatives, in which peasants and workers “combine 
their labor power, their enthusiasm, their wealth, and work cooperatively on the basis 
of strict equality” (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 134). He lists three types of rural 
cooperatives that could work within a larger socialist system: (1) seasonal, permanent 
labor pools, in which peasants accumulate their labor power to work the land as a 
cohesive productive unit; (2) production cooperatives that accumulate labor forces in a 
much stronger and more rigid organization than in the labor pools; and (3) common 
property cooperatives, the end goal, in which all tools are for the use of the common 
organization. Organization was the launching pad for his cooperative vision, since he 
believed that the masses required administration and leadership. Thus each of these 
proposals was to be state-assisted to “enable [cooperatives] to leap forward in strength, 
for the leadership of the cooperatives to be truly in the hands of the people, and 
working in the people’s interests” (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 136–137). But Hou stresses 
that these three types of cooperatives stand no chance of succeeding in improving 
peasants’ welfare without organization and financial backing. Cooperatives, he 
concludes, would usher in an era during which city and countryside, industry and 
agriculture will cooperate, or the Khmer people would have to resort to armed struggle 
against the American imperialists whose pervasive influence prevented the rural poor 
from escaping their prostrate socioeconomic status and condition (Kiernan and Boua 
1982, 139–147, 151, 156). 
In sum, Hou’s 1955 dissertation and 1964 book reflect clearly his thinking of the 
time, which he held until the CPK purged him in 1975. Throughout his life he maintained 
that peasants were Cambodia’s lifeblood, and he devoted much of his academic and 
political life to identifying and proposing solutions to rural problems, many of which 
weighed most heavily on the poorest strata. His dissertation brought to light many of 
the causes of peasant suffering: capitalist exploitation, foreign market dominance, usury, 
and a stark rural-urban divide. His solution was peasant organization in mutual aid 
teams and self-reliance. However, Hou was a moderate among his peers, and would 
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later become a victim of the CPK’s excesses. That is not to say that he did not have 
Communist views; rather, Hou presented ideas that, taken to their extreme by someone 
more radical, could alter Cambodia’s social, political, and economic landscape drastically. 
Hou’s protégé Khieu Samphan, for instance, was of such a mind; he expanded on many 
of Hou’s proposals with his suggestion for a temporary commitment to autarkical 
development to resuscitate light industry and handicrafts in Cambodia. As it turned out, 
Khieu Samphan’s ideas also had a lasting imprint on the Cambodian Communist 
movement. Once in power, the CPK committed the country to engaging selectively with 
foreign powers on Cambodia’s own terms and trading (directly and indirectly) with 
nations in accordance with the nonaligned movement’s pledge of developing socialism 
autonomously. For this reason, Hou’s earlier work is integral to uncovering the origins of 
the Cambodian Communist vision. 
 
From Page to Paddy: Hou Yuon’s Implementation of His Vision, 1953–1967 
 
Hou Yuon’s efforts and failure to put his ideas into practice led to his decision to join the 
Cambodian Communist movement in 1967. He opted for the legal parliamentary route, 
whereas his Paris colleague Saloth Sar became a revolutionary after returning from 
France in 1953. Hou, who returned in 1956, offered to collaborate with Sihanouk rather 
than topple his regime. But he failed in the face of Sihanouk’s repression, which in 1967 
forced him to struggle alongside progressive politicians such as Khieu Samphan and Hu 
Nim to flee to the maquis (bands of rural Cambodian Communist guerrillas) and join Sar. 
In the midst of the destructive Cambodian Civil War (1967–1975), Hou’s ideas, which 
had influenced the more expansive studies of Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim, became a 
basis for Democratic Kampuchea. However, Sar ousted critics like Hou after 1975, 
turning the revolution against ethnic and class enemies. Before the CPK’s radical vision 
became reality in the DK years there was the problem of fixing a broken system, a task 
that Hou believed earnestly could be done through cooperation. 
Hou’s return to Cambodia marked the beginning of a “new generation” of 
Cambodian politics. These French-educated leftists brought with them new perspectives 
from their encounters in the “radical ferment” of postwar Paris (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 
96). Hou was the first of the Paris-based doctoral students to return, in 1956 after 
accepting a position as Director and French instructor at the private Lycée Kambuboth, 
where he hired several left-wing teachers and worked alongside Saloth Sar and Ieng 
Sary (Kiernan 1985, 177). Hou was also an active Communist; he was a member of the 
organization Pracheachon (literally, “People’s group,” a legal front for the clandestine 
CPK) until Sihanouk coopted him (along with Khieu Samphan) into the Sangkum Riyastr 
Niyum to counterbalance the rightists in the National Assembly. Though never to be 
more than a “token force” in the staunch neutralist Sihanouk’s master plan to play 
“supreme arbiter” between left and right, such inclusion meant that Hou Yuon and 
Khieu Samphan could use their political positions as elected officials to put their 
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theories into practice (Short 2004, 129; Chandler 1999, 58). Both won seats in the 1958 
election. 
However, Cambodia’s political climate complicated any sort of vision that Hou Yuon 
had when he left Paris. Rather than undergo political and ideological training as a 
Communist cadre upon their return, patriotic intellectuals who wanted to become 
Communists were charged by their Vietnamese “big brothers” with petty tasks such as 
kitchen work and transport, and were occluded from the 1954 Geneva Conference 
(Kiernan 1996, 12–13). Afterward, Sihanouk guaranteed the young Cambodian nation’s 
first free elections in 1955, abdicating the throne to his father, King Suramarit, to found 
the Sangkum Riyastr Niyum (1955–1970), which swept the elections (Chandler 1991, 8). 
Sihanouk’s promise was empty; he suppressed and bribed leaders of the Khmer Issarak 
(Liberated Khmers) and Khmer Serei (Free Khmers), targeting leftists such as Hou for 
positions in his Royal Government to cement his position as the national father of sorts. 
The Communist movement suffered greatly: the Vietnamese-backed Pracheachon group 
lost the 1955 elections and went underground, and Son Ngoc Minh’s KPRP, the 
“Communist backbone” of the Khmer Issarak, lacked a clear political line. After King 
Suramarit’s death in April 1960, Sihanouk declared himself the permanent, neo-
monarchical head of state, which caused an irreparable schism between his loyalists, the 
aristocracy, and democratic intellectuals. He then set out to tighten his grip on power, 
exacting harsh repression on leftists and shuttering left-wing newspapers. Communists 
thus operated clandestinely, with Hou working as Communist operative in the 
Pracheachon within the Sangkum cabinet (Chandler 1991, 113, 118, 192–193). In Hou’s 
mind, any hope for political reform had to come by operating within Sihanouk’s 
government. 
Indeed, at this time Hou was a Communist who was “open” about his support for 
Sihanouk, even though it was insincere, being a tactical move for his own self-
preservation  (Chandler 1999, 55). Prime minister as of 1955, Sihanouk had adopted a 
Buddhist socialist stance, and although his frequent visits to China and meetings with 
Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai had instilled in him a desire to transform Cambodian 
society (Norodom 1963, 8), he was profoundly obstinate toward genuine structural 
changes. He instead relied on his overwhelming popular support among peasants as 
Cambodia’s devāraja (god-king) to ensure reelection. As Hou remarked, the “Popular 
Socialist Community of the ex-king Norodom Sihanouk” was merely a “political 
representative” of the wealthy minority, and despite its name, was staunchly 
conservative and vehemently anticommunist (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 97; Chandler 
1999, 57). Accordingly, the Sangkum was replete with “former corrupt and vagabond 
government officials” (Chandler, Kiernan, and Boua 1988, 239). Because of this 
overwhelming representation of Sihanouk loyalists and hardline conservatives, the party 
echoed its charismatic leader’s anticommunist stance: 
 
The constant progression of communism throughout the world is 
undeniable, and I cannot see what will stop it and make it retreat…. The 
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Western conception of Democracy seems to me the only one that is 
worthwhile from the viewpoint of the human condition, of human right 
and freedoms. Its superiority resides in the fact that it places Man at the 
summit, while Communism reduces him to the state of a slave to an all-
powerful State. (Short 2004, 130) 
 
Sihanouk’s cooptation of his leftist rivals was a ruse; though coopted leftists 
enjoyed some freedom, they were under close supervision and direction (Kiernan 1985, 
181). A dynamic presence in Cambodian politics at the time, Hou took advantage of his 
position, however limited, to put his dissertation’s theories in service to the lives of his 
rural constituency, especially because the government had the power to improve their 
lot. Although he was elected to the National Assembly controversially—he had a court 
case pending against him for “fomenting an illegal strike”—he became Minister of 
Commerce and Industry within Sihanouk’s cabinet (Short 2004, 129). 
Hou Yuon pushed consistently for reform. Between 1958 and 1963, he occupied 
many different ministerial posts, including one as Minister of the Economy, undertaking 
a relentless political struggle to transform the rural sector (Kiernan 1985, 181, 204). 
Repression against leftist politicians was ruthless, yet he reached out to peasants, 
including one instance in Saukong when he defended them against an absentee 
landlord’s seizure of their lands (Kiernan 1985, 244n217). This incident aside, Hou soon 
realized that democracy was a facade in Cambodia. “One can no longer say anything 
without risk of being thrown into prison and tortured,” he remarked, and no doubt he 
experienced it firsthand whenever Sihanouk launched into a tirade against him (Kiernan 
1985, 216). Yet Hou, ever the devoted public servant, did not forestall Sangkum efforts 
to nationalize specific industries in the early 1960s, though he was certainly wary of 
them (Kiernan 1985, 206). 
Hou Yuon’s Banha sahakor is a testament to his commitment to Cambodia. It 
outlines his political vision, despite its insincere pro-Sihanouk rhetoric. A guidebook for 
socialist transition, Banha sahakor urged the socialist and conservative Sangkum 
branches to form a united front against U.S. imperialism (Chandler 1999, 57). Hou 
lauded Sihanouk’s neutrality and opposition to U.S. adventurism, regarding his late-1963 
domestic reforms (“the royal form of nationalization”) for their establishment of “means 
to build up the national economy in the interests of the people” (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 
134). But Hou still opposed the revolutionary route to rectify the peasant problem: “We 
must understand that class conflict should be resolved by a method that will not 
damage the unity of the nation against the American imperialists” (Hou 1964, 11). Never 
afraid to speak his mind, especially when it was in opposition to policies that were in 
contravention to peasant interest, Hou won reelection in 1962. His understudy in Paris, 
Khieu Samphan, joined him and became a Member of Parliament in the National 
Assembly that same year. Along with Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim, Hou Yuon was 
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reelected by a large margin in September 1966 (Kiernan 1985, 232–233; Chandler 1991, 
154).7 
However, in Phnom Penh during the mid-to-late 1960s, the rising popularity of 
radical thought, particularly from Communist China, disturbed Sihanouk who, after 
nearly a decade of singing Chairman Mao Zedong’s praises (Sihanouk once referred to 
him as the “great venerated guide of the Cambodian people”), had come to regard 
China’s foreign policy as a significant disruption (Norodom 1963, 7; 1956, 1–2). Fearful 
that Hou and other leftist AAKC members were plotting to usurp his leadership, he 
“became distressed by news that the Little Red Book was popular,” and imprisoned or 
ordered the execution of pro-Chinese students (Chandler 1999, 83). Sihanouk also 
became suspicious of Chinese journals, which declared that “all Cambodian workers 
believed in Chairman Mao,” while Zhou Enlai’s plea for Chinese “to display their pride of 
the Cultural Revolution and their love for Chairman Mao” caused many Sino-Khmers in 
Phnom Penh to mimic the Cultural Revolution’s fervor (Chandler 1991, 169). Aware of 
the Beijing link to leftist intellectuals in Paris and Phnom Penh, Sihanouk urged Beijing to 
cease “meddling in internal affairs” (Ying and Shi 1983, 106; Chandler 1991, 170). 
Sihanouk removed leftists from their posts, severed ties with them, and shuttered the 
AAKC. Although Sihanouk had promised not to interfere, he feared Hou’s mounting 
popularity and published toxic polemics on Cambodian Communism during their 
campaigns. He threatened to bring each member of the Paris Group before a military 
tribunal, which escalated into threats of outright execution. Hou fled to the countryside 
immediately to join Saloth Sar in the maquis in 1967 (Norodom 1972, 90; Chandler 1991, 
165–166). 
By 1967, the political route to reforming Cambodia was all but dead. The CPK had 
determined that political struggle was the incorrect line, though Communists who held 
ministerial posts remained steadfast. But Sihanouk had grown paranoid by the 1966 
elections because of the popularity of Hou and his Paris-educated colleagues. Sihanouk 
accused China and pro-China officials such as Hou of fomenting revolution, stating, “At 
present I find that China has made a serious change because she has given up peaceful 
coexistence and the five principles. China had changed her policy since the Cultural 
Revolution. There have been a number of Khmer who aid China” (Kiernan and Boua 
1982, 181; Zhang 1996, 161). Right-wingers and commercial representatives within the 
National Assembly, too, remained ever recalcitrant, repealing policies proposed by the 
Paris Group. Afterward, Hou received a vote of no confidence in the National Assembly 
over his unwillingness to toe the Sihanouk line, which culminated in his resignation. His 
protégé Khieu Samphan lost the confidence of both the National Assembly and the 
government, and conceded that there was nothing to salvage from the “unreformable” 
state (Kiernan 1985, 204–205). Sihanouk grew increasingly angry with both popular 
                                               
7 Hou Yuon won 78 percent of the vote in his Kompong Cham electorate. 
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ministers who had exposed for all to see the broken nature of the National Assembly. 
He responded by threatening the lives of Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan.8  
After joining the maquis, Hou Yuon became Minister of the Interior of GRUNK, 
charged with community development and cooperatives (Ieng Sary 1970, 17; Ross 1990, 
43–44). He was, in actuality, one of the leaders of Angkar (Organization), the CPK’s 
secret title as early as March 1971, and used it to downplay leadership of the revolution 
to stress collective involvement (Ith Sarin 1973, 56). Although he occupied an arguably 
ceremonial post, Hou was far from silent. He was very popular among peasants and 
urban intellectuals for his modesty and incorruptibility as a politician. For this reason, 
Pol Pot needed him to mobilize people, that is, until he branded him as “revisionist” and 
“materialistic” after the 1975 takeover. Yet initially, Pol Pot trusted Hou as a CPK 
mouthpiece. Hou’s September 30, 1974 statement on the twenty-third anniversary of 
the CPK movement in Amlaing district is evidence of his importance as a party 
spokesperson and leader. As Hou proclaimed in an hour-long address, the CPK 
movement had been “successful both inside and outside the country, and was graded 
the number-three movement in the world, after China and Albania…[and] allied 
countries, like China and Korea, [have] come to learn from us” (Hou [1974] 2002, 5). He 
then echoed his earlier diagnosis of Cambodia as still “half-feudalist, half-colonialist and 
imperialist, and under the rule of foreigners politically, militarily, economically, socially, 
and culturally,” which was also Pol Pot’s assessment by as late as 1977 ([1974] 2002, 5). 
The solution, Hou urged, was to distinguish friend from enemy in pursuit of ideological 
purity: “From this moment on, cadres and armies have to completely liberate the 
country, but do not forget…we must first get rid of the enemies within ourselves. You 
have to classify who is friend and who is enemy, and stick to the stances of politics, 
solidarity, ideology, and organization” ([1974] 2002, 5). He listed sixteen points to which 
all cadres must adhere, with the most noteworthy ones calling for all cadres and soldiers 
to love, respect, and serve the people of the party, laborers, and peasants with their 
hearts and souls; honestly and regularly carry out criticism and self-criticism within each 
section, and promote internal agreement; hold the spirit of self-consciousness and self-
reliance; and believe that, although their struggle is hard, they will succeed (Hou 1975, 
5). Many of these “solutions” became pillars of Democratic Kampuchea and 
characterized life under the veritable police state of the Pol Pot regime. 
 
                                               
8 In his fight to seize power, Sihanouk’s diatribe at a conference at Meru Terrace against them for 
their supposed role in fomenting the Samlaut Rebellion of March and April 1967 pushed them to 
flee secretly to the maquis to join their Communist brethren (Hu Nim 1977, 19–20; Ieng Sary 
1970, 16–17). Announcement of their disappearance led many to speculate that Sihanouk had 
ordered their execution (Norodom 1972, 90). Their popularity as representatives of the 
marginalized prompted widespread mourning; in Kandal province, more than fifteen thousand 
students gathered at temples to grieve the “martyrdom of Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan” 
(Chandler 1991, 167). Thus began the legend of the “Three Ghosts” (Hu Nim was the third): 
ostracized yet popular leftist ministers who reappeared in 1970 as leaders of the CPK. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
A comprehensive genealogy of Cambodian Communism from its origins in Paris to the 
streets of Cambodia’s cities to the rice paddies of the countryside is a long, winding road 
that at once stares backward to account for the social experiences of its masterminds 
(Hou Yuon included), and forward to connect radical ideology to its brutal realization. 
Men such as Hou, who became Communists, took different routes to their radicalization. 
Hou showed a commitment to alter Cambodia’s developmental and political course 
within the existing system, opting instead for peasant outreach. He did not agree 
monolithically with the same kind of Communism as his peers, either, as he favored a 
pragmatic, managerial interpretation of Marxist concepts and their applicability and 
adaptability in Cambodia. Future CPK co-founder Saloth Sar, by contrast, cared little for 
dense texts and preferred what he saw in practice, differing from HouYuon in the use of 
“revolutionary terror.” Hou tried and failed to put his dissertation’s proposals into 
practice, joining the Cambodian Communist movement (1967–1975). 
But before Hou Yuon and his Paris colleagues went down in infamy as leaders of a 
Communist revolution—one that Pol Pot led down one of the darkest and most violent 
paths of the past century—they were passionate students who genuinely cared about 
liberating their motherland from exploitation and painstakingly went about identifying 
problems in Cambodia’s labor sectors. Hou, in particular, had tremendous acumen when 
it came to peasant grievances, having lived that life before. Naturally, Hou shares blame 
for the horrors of the DK regime as he was a member of the CPK Central Committee and 
rallied some oppressed poor and landless peasants to join the revolution (though less 
than in the cases of China or in Vietnam, as Sihanouk’s endorsement of the CPK gave the 
party greater appeal). The realization of the CPK’s Communist vision after April 17, 
1975—the day that it captured Phnom Penh—was sadly the beginning of a four-year 
project that would set the already downtrodden country back several decades, and cost 
the lives of nearly a third of its people, including the outspoken and critical Hou Yuon. 
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